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Database management systems (DBMS) represent 
the ultimate layer in preventing malicious data access 
or corruption and implement several security 
mechanisms to protect data. However these 
mechanisms cannot always stop malicious users from 
accessing data by exploiting system vulnerabilities. 
The aim of this paper is to propose an intrusion 
detection mechanism for DBMS to fill this gap. Our 
approach consists of a comprehensive representation 
of user database utilization profiles to perform 
concurrent intrusion detection. Prior to the detection it 
is necessary to define and learn these utilization 
profiles. Profiles are defined using a three level 
abstraction and learned directly from monitoring the 
database utilization in real conditions. The proposed 
mechanism is generic and can be easily implemented 




A major problem faced by organizations today is 
the protection of their data against malicious access or 
corruption. Database security mechanisms offer basic 
security features such as authentication, authorization, 
access control, data encryption, and auditing. However, 
these mechanisms do not assure protection against 
DBMS vulnerabilities exploits and are very limited in 
defending data attacks from the inside the organization 
or from unsecured applications. 
The general lack of intrusion detection features in 
commercial DBMS is an important limitation since 
malicious actions in a database environment may not 
be filtered by existing intrusion detection mechanisms 
at the network or the operating system levels. For 
example, inside attacks (e.g., a disgruntled employee 
that may access and damage critical private data) are 
particularly difficult to detect and isolate, because as 
these attacks are carried out by legitimate users that 
may have access rights to data and system resources. In 
addition, masquerade attacks where people hide their 
identity by impersonating others are one of the most 
frequent forms of computer security attacks [1]. 
Another example is SQL injection in web applications, 
where an attacker changes the SQL commands sent to 
the server, and therefore, accessing sensitive data. 
This paper proposes a new intrusion detection 
mechanism that adds concurrent intrusion detection to 
DBMS using a comprehensive set of behavior 
abstractions representing database activity. 
 
2. Proposed approach 
 
The proposed mechanism is based on anomaly 
detection and includes a learning phase and a detection 
phase. Very briefly, the database utilization profile is 
gathered as a first step to feed the learning phase. Once 
the database utilization profile is established, the 
information collected is used to concurrently detect 
database intrusions. The mechanism is able to detect 
and stop database attacks while calling the database 
administrator (DBA) attention (e.g., by sending an 
email or an SMS message, etc.). 
We use three abstraction levels to define the user 
profile representing his/her database activity: command 
level, transaction level, and session level. The intrusion 
detection is based on a set of security constraints 
defined at each of these three levels. A database access 
that violates any security constraints defined at any 
level is considered a potential intrusion: 
• Command level: checks if the structure of each 
executed command belongs to the set of 
command structures previously learned.  
• Transaction level: checks if the command is in the 
right place inside the transaction profile (a 
transaction is a unit formed by a set of SQL 
commands always executed in the same 
sequence). 
• Session level: checks if the transaction fits in a 
known transaction sequence. It represents the 
sequence of operations that the user executes in a 
session.  
Intrusion detection activity starts at the lowest level 
(command level). If no intrusion is detected at this 
level, the detection continues at the next level 
(transaction level), and so on. If no restriction is 
violated after having passed all levels, the command is 
considered valid. 
Different implementation alternatives for data 
capturing can be followed, including external database 
approaches, such as using a proxy or a sniffer, or 
taking advantage of database auditing features 
available in most of DBMS (the audit approach was 
used by Vieira et al [3], with quite good results). The 
detection mechanism can also be implemented inside 
the DBMS (although this requires the DBMS 
modification).  
 
3. Preliminary results 
 
In this section we present the experiments 
conducted to evaluate our intrusion detection 
mechanism. The sniffer approach has been used as it 
has no impact on the server performance (it is located 
in a different computer). It is also a non intrusive 
technique which turns out to be the best approach to 
use with real database scenarios. For the DBMS we 
have chosen the Oracle 10g since it is one of the most 
representative in the market. The experimental setup 
includes three computers connected through an 
Ethernet broadband router/switch. We used two 
different database application scenarios in this 
evaluation:  
• A well-known database performance benchmark, 
the TPC-W, which provides a controlled database 
environment quite adequate for initial evaluation 
of the learning algorithm and for the evaluation of 
coverage and latency. After a learning period the 
mechanism has been evaluated considering 
correct commands executed randomly and correct 
commands slightly changed. 
• A real large hospital database sterilization 
application to assess mainly the transaction 
learning curve in a real situation. This allows us 
to obtain the time window necessary to perform a 
representative learning of the transactions.  
The intrusion detection efficiency can be 
characterized by the following measures: coverage, 
latency, false positives, and impact in the performance. 
In the first step we have run TPC-W for 51 minutes 
to learn the transactions. We have then executed TPC-
W intensively in order to assess if the all the 
transactions were successfully. We have observed that 
only one valid TPC-W transaction was detected as 
malicious. The injection of slightly changed leaded to a 
coverage of 100%, while de injection of correct SQL 
commands in a random order (i.e., invalid transactions) 
leaded to 4.2% of false negatives. 
In another experiment we have manually injected 
50 malicious commands while the TPC-W was running 
to produce the load. All these 50 commands were 
detected as intrusions. The largest latency time 
obtained was 10 milliseconds and the average latency 
time was 1.6 milliseconds. In all the commands the 
detection was done before the server reply to the 
malicious command, which makes the detection, was 
made before the next command after the malicious 
command. The query was very simple, which means it 
was quickly executed by the server. 
Concerning the learning curve using the real 
database application, we could observe that the rate of 
transactions learning is very quick at the beginning, 
reducing over the time. In certain periods of the day or 
the week we could see that some new transactions were 
executed. This should be due to some specific 
procedures that are executed at a very specific moment. 
 
4. Conclusion and future work 
 
In this paper we present a new mechanism for the 
detection of malicious transactions in DBMS. It uses a 
representation of the profile of the user utilization of 
the database using three levels of detail (command, 
transaction and session) to detect the intrusions. The 
database intrusion detection mechanism consists of two 
main phases: transaction learning and concurrent 
intrusion detection. This mechanism is generic as it can 
be used in any typical DBMS, including stat-of-the-art 
commercial DBMS. A set of experiments were 
performed using one implementation of the mechanism 
based on the sniffer approach (one of the proposed 
alternatives). The experimental results show that the 
proposed mechanism is quite effective and can be 
easily implemented. For future work we intend to 
develop other architectures presented and compare 
their results. Another objective is to include a damage 
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